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I. Introduction 
It is very true that “claimants, no matter how ignoble, sometimes raise important 
issues.”1 This is clearly the case in the dispute that arose between Yusuf and Kadi and 
the institution of the European Communities (EC). With the decisions rendered on 
September 21, 2005 in the Yusuf and Kadi cases,2 the Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities (CFI) refused to review the European Regulation 881/2002 that 
contains the list of individuals and entities whose assets must be frozen, due to suspected 
                                                 
* Attorney at Law, Bar of Milan; Ph.D. in international economic law, expected 2007, Luigi Bocconi 
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1 Michael W. Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 83 (1993), at 
86. 
2 Court of First Instance [CFI], case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf, Al Barakaat Int’l Found’n v. Council and 
Commission (Sept. 21, 2005), [2005] E.C.R. II-3533, app’d under case C-415/05, [2006] OJ C48, 11; case 
T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission (Sept. 21, 2005), [2005] E.C.R. II-3649, 
app’d under case C-402/05, [2006] OJ C36, 19. Philippe Weckel, Chronique de jurisprudence 
internationale, 109 REVUE GÉN. DR. INT. PUBLIC 957 (2005). 
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terrorist links.3  This measure is part of a large effort to stem terrorist financing.4 In 
particular, Regulation 881 had been adopted by the Council of the European Union for 
regionally implement of the measures that the U.N. Security Council (SC) had enacted 
since 1999, and that required member states to freeze the assets of individuals and 
entities affiliated to the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Yusuf, together with the company Al 
Barakaat and other individuals, filed a petition to the CFI in 2001, seeking the 
annulment of the Regulation according to article 230 of the European Communities 
Treaty.5 They contended that the insertion of their names in the list was inaccurate, and, 
moreover, that the mechanism of the insertion itself breached their fundamental rights. 
The CFI held that Regulation 881 and the list may not be challenged, because they 
derive from SC determinations which bind member states according to the U.N. Charter. 
Therefore, they cannot be impugned even when translated into European norms, unless 
they violate jus cogens.6 In this case, however, the Court found no breach of jus cogens, 
since the right to judicial review, while supposedly one of the fundamental rights 
                                                 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, imposing certain specific restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and 
the Taliban, and repealing Regulation no. 467/2001, OJ L 139 of May 29, 2002, p. 9. 
4 See generally Yas Banifatemi, La lutte contre le financement du terrorisme international, 48 Annuaire 
français de droit international 103 (2002), at 113 ff.; INTERNATIONAL MUNETARY FUND, LEGAL 
DEPARTMENT, SUPPRESSING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (2003), at 4; Mark Pieth, Financing of 
Terrorism: Following the Money, 4 EUR. J.L. REFORM 365 (2002). 
5 Treaty Establishing the European Community, consolidated version, art. 230, OJ C 325 of Dec. 20, 2002 
(“[t]he Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission other than 
recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member 
State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or 
misuse of powers. Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings 
against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a 
regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former”). 
6 As well known, jus cogens comprends all those norms which cannot be derogated by international 
agreements. See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed on May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, art. 53 (“[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character”). 
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contemplated by the jus cogens, can be derogated for reasons of international peace and 
security. 
This note wishes to criticize the CFI’s analysis of the problem of ensuring a 
judicial review of measures concerning the freezing of terrorist assets. We will start by 
describing the way in which the SC enacted the resolutions that represent the legal 
ground of the European Regulation at stake. Like any other measure affecting individual 
freedom, also these resolutions, and obviously the related regulations, directly impact 
human rights protection. Such human rights concerns raise the question of “the 
possibility individuals have to bring an action to enforce these rights.”7 The first part of 
the paper will be devoted to a general overview of the U.N. framework (II.A) and the 
perspective of limiting U.N. actions (II.B). Second, we will address, generally, the 
regime of EC implementation of U.N. Resolutions, generally (III.A), and from the 
viewpoint of the Yusuf decision (III.B). Third, we will formulate some criticism of Yusuf 
(IV) and, finally, make some concluding remarks (IV). 
 
II. The U.N. framework: Security Council resolutions and their implementation 
A. General view 
The proceedings that resulted in a freezing of the terrorist assets are part of  what 
are commonly termed “smart sanctions.”8 This definition refers to the sanctions’ 
precision regarding its targets. Smart sanctions are supposedly efficient weapons against 
terrorism. For instance, on the one hand they allow authorities to maximize prevention in 
                                                 
7 Translation from French. Annalisa Ciampi, L’Union européenne et le respect des droits de l’homme dans 
la mise en œuvre des sanctions devant la Cour européenne des droit de l’homme, 90 REVUE GÉN. DR. INT. 
PUBLIC 85 (2006), at 112 [“la possibilité pour les particuliers affectés d’avoir des recours disponibles pour 
faire valoir leurs droits”].   
8 The term “smart sanctions” indicates measures taken for numbered purposes against certain subjects. 
More precisely, “[t]he essence of smart sanction is narrowly targerting the controls at the individual or 
entity concerned, within or without a particular geography or nation”. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing 
“Smart Sanctions” Against Terrorism Wisely, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 957 (2001-2002), at 961. 
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order to halt potential attacks by depriving terrorists of their current resources. On the 
other hand, they are presumably so precise as to avoid collateral harms against third 
parties who might be indirectly involved in the activity of terrorist organizations. The 
system of terrorist financing prevention is based on a “proscription lists” (or 
“blacklists”) model: persons and entities bear some legal consequences with respect to 
their property rights, as a result of their simple insertion in the list. Originally, this 
regime had been used by the United States when sanctioning foreign countries, but in the 
mid-1990s it became the normal protocol for preventing the financing of terrorism.9 
Soon it shifted from a framework inspired by repressive/sanctioning purposes to one of 
pure preventive aims, and has been adopted by the international community as an 
expression of its global efforts to prevent terrorist assaults.10 
The United Nations has adopted the blacklist model since 1999. At that time, the 
SC reacted to the attacks of August 7, 1998, against the U.S. embassies in Dar es-Salam, 
Tanzania, and Nairoby, Kenya,11 by enacting Resolution 1267 (1999).12 This Resolution 
sought to sanction the Taliban for hosting Osama bin Laden, and imposed on member 
states the freezing of all funds and resources owned or controlled by the Taliban.13 By 
                                                 
9 United States used intensely these measures thus far. Indeed, freezing orders originates in that country as 
a sanction against foreign states and entities. The sanctioning system against terrorists has been enacted by 
Congress in 1996 with the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), then improved by the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strenghtening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act), Pub. L. No. 
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).  Precisely, see Eric Broxmeyer, The Problems of Security and Freedom: 
Procedural Due Process and The Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Penalty Act, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 439 (2004), at 444. See Geneviève Burdeau, 
Le gel d’avoirs étrangers, 124 JOURN. DR. INT. 5 (1997), at 23 ff.  
10 Accordingly, “the movement towards smart sanctions is influencing not only the U.S. and other nations’ 
unilateral sanctions programs, but also those multilateral sanctions efforts coordinated under the auspices 
of the Security Council”. Peter L. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, at 961. 
11 In its resolution 1189 (1998), the Security Council called upon states to collaborate and support 
investigations concerning these attacks. See S.C. Res. 1189, § 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1198 (Aug. 13, 1998). 
12 S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).  
13 Accordingly, “[a]ll states shall freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or 
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking 
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the same resolution, the SC created a Committee (“Taliban Committee”, TC), consisting 
of all Council members, whose function is in short to “designate funds or other financial 
resources”14 to be frozen. Resolution 1267 and the appointment of the TC represent the 
core of the proscription list system against the Taliban regime under the U.N. Charter.  
Unsurprisingly, this practice has been progressively extended to Al Qaeda and 
Usama bin Laden. Resolution 1333 (2000), after imposing new sanctions on Afghanistan 
for the government’s support of terrorist groups, bound states to freeze the assets of 
Osama bin Laden and his affiliated organization.15 Moreover, the SC “request[ed]” that 
the TC “maintain an updated list, based on information provided by States and regional 
organizations, of the individuals and entities designated as being associated with Usama 
bin Laden, including those in the Al-Qaida organization.”16 
Other resolutions followed. For instance, Resolutions 1363 (2001),17 1390 
(2002),18 and 1455 (2003)19 implemented the previously cited measures, while 
                                                                                                                                                
owned or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, 
and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are made available, 
by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any 
undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban”. S.C. Res. 1267, § 4, supra note 
12. 
14 Id., § 6(e). 
15 S.C. Res. 1333, § 8(c), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (Dec. 19, 2000) (requiring states “[t]o freeze without 
delay funds and other financial assets of Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him 
as designated by the Committee, including those in the Al-Qaida organization, and including funds 
derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by Usama bin Laden and 
individuals and entities associated with him, and to ensure that neither they nor any other funds or 
financial resources are made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, directly 
or indirectly for the benefit of Usama bin Laden, his associates or any entities owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by Usama bin Laden or individuals and entities associated with him including the 
Al-Qaida organization”). 
16 Id. 
17 S.C. Res. 1363, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1363 (July 30, 2001). This resolution implements the framework of 
the Committee, on one hand creating a Monitoring Group and a Sanction Enforcement Support Team (id., 
§§ 4(a) and 4(b)) and, on the other hand, calling all states to enforce the measures established by the 
previous resolutions through domestic regulations, either legislative of administrative (see id., § 8). 
18 S.C. Res. 1390, at § 2, establishes that all states “shall take the following measures with respect to 
Usama bin Laden, members of the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, 
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Resolution 1617 (2005) consolidated the existing lists regarding the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda.20 On November 7, 2002, the Committee enacted some Guidelines concerning the 
decision-making process, the nature of the lists, and the purposes of the Committee 
itself.21  
It is important to distinguish the SC framework from the one that characterises the 
TC. In formal terms, the latter is an “operational committee,” created by the former 
                                                                                                                                                
undertakings and entities associated with them, as referred to in the list created pursuant to resolutions 
1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) to be updated regularly by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 
1267 (1999) […]:  
(a) Freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, including funds derived from property 
owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or 
at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds, financial assets or 
economic resources are made available, directly or indirectly, for such persons’ benefit, by 
their nationals or by any persons within their territory;  
(b) Prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories of these individuals […];  
(c) Prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer, to these individuals, groups, 
undertakings and entities from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, 
or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types including 
weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and 
spare parts for the aforementioned and technical advice, assistance, or training related to 
military activities.” 
S.C. Res. 1390, § 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1390 (Jan. 16, 2002). 
19 S.C. Res. 1455, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1455 (Jan. 17, 2003). This resolution implements furtherly the 
measures already established by the Council with the mentioned resolutions. Specifically, Council asks the 
Committee to communicate the proscription lists to the states every three months and 
“stresses to all Member States the importance of submitting to the Committee the names 
and identifying information, to the extent possible, of and about members of the Al-Qaida 
organization and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
associated with them so that the Committee can consider adding new names and details to 
its list, unless to do so would compromise investigations or enforcement actions.” 
Id., § 4. 
20 S.C. Res. 1617, § 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1617 (July 29, 2005).  
21 SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1267 (1999) CONCERNING 
AL-QAIDA AND THE TALIBAN AND ASSOCIATED INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES, GUIDELINES OF THE 
COMMITTEE FOR THE CONDUCT OF ITS WORK (Adopted on Nov. 7, 2002, as amended on April 10, 2003 
and revised on Dec. 21, 2005) [hereinafter “Taliban Committee’s Guidelines”], available on the Internet at 
the address “www.un.org/Docs/sc/ committees/1267/1267_guidelines.pdf.” 
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according to article 29 of the Charter.22 Article 1 of the aforementioned Guidelines states 
that the TC is a “subsidiary organ of the Security Council.”23 This means, basically, that 
any responsibility for the TC’s behaviour should be referred back to the SC. In fact, if 
members cannot deliberate by consensus inside the TC, the decision is adopted by the 
SC.24 Moreover, aside from the modification of the Guidelines, the TC has no regulatory 
power. Its unique meaningful power impacts the list: it can “seek” information from 
states, “update regularly” the list, “cooperate” with other Sanction Committees, 
“examine the records submitted by member states”, “consider […] requests concerning 
the exceptions”, and “consider requests by member states for additional information”.25 
The only area in which the TC seems to “decide” is the relevance of information 
submitted by states, regional or international organizations,26 but even here, the 
Committee “cannot appraise the merit of the information”.27 Even in the de-listing 
decisions, the Committee appears to be nothing more than a means of communication 
between the member states, since a listing or de-listing decision cannot be made without 
the vote of all states.28 
Moreover, one must keep in mind the distinction between the TC and the so-called 
“Counter-Terrorism Committee” (CTC), founded by Resolution 1373 (2001).29 The 
                                                 
22 Likewise Emmanuel Decaux, Article 29, in JEAN-PIERRE COT, ALAIN PELLET (EDS.), LA CHARTE DES 
NATIONS UNIES. COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE  975 (3rd ed., 2005), 984. 
23 Taliban Committee’s Guidelines, § 1(2), supra note 21. 
24 Id., § 4(a). 
25 See respectively id., § 4(a), (b), (c), (d), (i), (k). 
26 See Id., § 6. 
27 Mauro Megliani, Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Freezing the Assets of International Terrorist 
Organizations, in ANDREA BIANCHI (ED.), ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 
377 (2004), 382. 
28 This seems to be a common character for some Sanction Committee established by the Security 
Council. For a precedent, see Martti Koskenniemi, Le Comité des Sanctions, 37 ANN. FR. DR. INT. 119 
(1991), 122 f. 
29 S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
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CTC is asked “to monitor the implementation of this resolution,”30 but it has no 
decisional power with respect to any names of terrorists or entities connected with them. 
The reason for this lack of power is easily understandable. While there is a general 
consensus at an international level on the danger of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, there is 
still confusion about a general definition of “terrorism”31 and, accordingly, uncertainty 
on the appropriateness of targeting other groups. Outside the context of Al Qaeda and 
Osama bin Laden, states still do not agree globally on what “terrorism” is.32 This 
ambiguity clearly affects the measures’ precision and thus the real accuracy of “smart 
sanctions”. Moreover, such doubts impact the effectiveness of Resolution 1373 
framework, since without a common definition, states could devise their own in order to 
escape the obligations stated by the SC. 33 The role of the CTC thus becomes nothing 
                                                 
30 S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 29, at § 6. 
31 On this problem see Christian Walter, Defining Terrorism in National and International Law, in 
CHRISTIAN WALTER ET AL., TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY? 23 (2004), 33 ff.; Eric Hugues, La notion de terrorisme en droit 
international: en quête d’une définition juridique, 129 JOURN. DR. INT. 753 (2002); Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, Definition of Terrorism, 79 ISR. YEARB. HUM. RIGHTS 39 (1989), at p. 43; Geoffrey Levitt, 
Is Terrorism Worth Defining?, 13 OHIO NORTH. UNIV. L.R. 97 (1989), at p. 109 ff.; John F. Murphy, 
Defining International Terrorism: A Way Out the Quagmire, 19 ISR. YB HUM. RIGHTS 13 (1989), at p. 22. 
32 The lack of consensus in the definition of terrorism is due to the problematic distinction between 
freedom movements and terrorist organizations. As known, according to classic international law the fight 
for freedom of peoples should be considered a lawful purpose for States do not want to agree on a 
definition of terrorism that could arise their individual responsibility for having refrained to combat a 
specific organization. See Mauro Megliani, Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 27, at 397 (“there is 
still no consensus on a proper definition of the term, mostly because of the difficulty in drawing a 
distinction between international terrorism and freedom movements”); Christian Walter, supra note 31, at 
35 ff.; ADRIAN GUELKE, THE AGE OF TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1995), at 80; 
Denis G. Touret, Terrorism and Freedom in International Law, 2 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 363 (1979-1980), at 
368 ff.; Geoffrey Levitt, supra note 31, at 109, notes that “governments that have a strong political stake 
in the promotion of ‘national liberation movements’ are loath to subscribe a definition of terrorism that 
would criminalize broad areas of conduct habitually resorted of such groups, and on the other end of the 
spectrum, governments against which these groups’ violent activities are directed are obviously reluctant 
to subscribe to a definition that would criminalize their own use of force in response of such activities or 
otherwise”. See recently RICHARD H. SHULTZ JR., AND ANDREA J. DEW, INSURGENTS, TERRORISTS, AND 
MILITIAS: THE WARRIORS OF CONTEMPORARY COMBAT (2006). 
33 The lack of a definition of “terrorism”, even in the framework of the CTC, generates a problem in the 
concrete implementation of SC Resolutions, from the standpoint of the prosecution of organizations that 
even only one state refuses to consider as a terrorist one. On this point, see Eric Rosand, Security Council 
Resolution 1373, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Fight against Terrorism, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 
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more than a forum for dialogue, despite its usefulness in determining the terms of 
assistance for states. From this standpoint, unlike the TC, the CTC is not an operational 
entity depending on the SC; rather, it is an independent technical agency, that does not 
report to the SC and is only designed to help states to implement the Resolution’s 
standards their domestic legislations toward.34 However, like the TC, the CTC cannot 
evaluate the merits of any decision made by a state to include certain persons in the 
definition of “terrorist organization”.35 
 
B. Challenging the SC Resolutions under a human rights perspective 
What happens when individual rights are violated by a SC Resolution? In the case 
of the abovementioned resolutions concerning the financing of terrorism, they affect the 
property rights of the individuals and entities whose names are reported on the blacklist. 
How can those parties challenge the list and obtain its review if it contains mistakes? 
The question brings up several issues.  
                                                                                                                                                
333, 340 (2003) (arguing that “[i]t is possible that the CTC could run into a situation where a state is not 
prosecuting an individual or group for acts that the majority of countries on the CTC believe are terrorist 
acts, but that the country in question does not. Should the CTC turn a blind eye to this problem, with the 
understanding that it is not for the CTC to decide which individuals or groups are in fact “terrorists”? If 
the CTC begins to broaden its focus from building technical capacity to monitoring implementation of the 
laws and executive machinery designed to deal with terrorism, it may find itself engaged in the same 
definitional debate that the General Assembly is involved in, and thus run the risk of losing the broad 
support and cooperation from states that it has received to date”). 
34 By virtue of resolution 1373, supra note 28, the CTC has no duties to report to the Security Council if a 
state has violated its obligations according to the resolution itself. Notice that the TC, instead, has this duty 
(see supra note 25). Accordingly, in April 2003 the CTC deliberated not to report any information to the 
Security Council about the situations of non compliance in which states could be found. On this 
interesting point see Eric Rosand, supra note 33, at 336. 
35 This happens because the resolution no. 1373 (2001) does not contain a definition of terrorism. See 
supra note 33. Moreover, standing this mandate of the CTC, that seems to be merely technical, one should 
question the qualification of the CTC itself as an “operational subsidiary organ” of the Security Council. 
For instance, Emmanuel Decaux, Article 29, supra note 22, at 985, considers the CTC as a “comité 
opérationnel”, as opposed to other “comités techniques”, but then he defines the CTC as “une véritable 
‘agence’ au sein du Conseil de sécurité”. See also, on the problem of qualification of subsidiary organs in 
the U.N. system, Andreas Paulus, Article 29, in BRUNO SIMMA ET AL. (EDS.), 1 THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS. A COMMENTARY 701 (2d ed., 2002), at 553. 
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First, one should question the basis for the SC’s jurisdiction over the matter. From 
this standpoint, it is worth recalling the effects of the SC Resolutions based on articles 
2536 and 10337 of the U.N. Charter. These norms’ coordination results in a situation in 
which member states must carry out the SC decisions –– adopted after having 
ascertained a threat to or breach of peace –– which prevail over every other international 
law norm. Since a state cannot invoke domestic law to refrain from performing a treaty 
obligation,38 the SC measures established under Chapter VII have absolute supremacy 
even in the domestic sphere. Second, SC’s power to adopt measures under Chapter VII 
extends as far as a certain situation represents a “threat to the peace” or a “breach of the 
peace” according to article 39.39 Here the SC enjoys “full discretion”.40 The Charter does 
not indicate any limitation to SC action. Indeed, international practice shows that the SC 
has consistently recognised for two decades that terrorism represents a very serious 
threat to peaceful international relations. The fact that the Council’s target can be 
                                                 
36 U.N. Charter art. 25 (“[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions 
of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter”). 
37 U.N. Charter art. 103 (“[i]n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail”). Cf. Jean-Marc Thouvenin, Article 103, in 2 LA 
CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES, supra note 22, at 2133, 2135; Alix Toublanc, L’article 103 et la valeur 
juridique de la Charte des Nations Unies, 108 REVUE GÉN. DR. INT. PUBLIC 439 (2004), at 445 f. 
38 See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, supra note 6 (“[a] party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”). 
39 See U.N. Charter art. 39 (“[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security”). 
40 See Judge Weeramantry’s dissent in Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal 
Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Lybian Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of 
America), Provisional Measures, 1992 ICJ REP. 176 (April 14, 1992). See again Anthony Aston, supra 
note 44, who reveals that even with these broad powers the Security Council still uses discretion in a 
rational way. According to this author, “states represented on the Council take their responsibilities very 
seriously, whether they are permanent of non-permanent members”, and “there are important checks and 
balances within the Security Council”. Id., p. 34. 
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described as a phenomenon, and not a “situation” referred to a certain state;41 that it uses 
“its powers under Chapter VII […] to impose […] certain obligations, general, uniform 
and world-wide in scope, whose aim is to fight against a danger of global nature;”42 and 
that, finally, its action “[is] not merely directed at a particular terrorist act, but at all 
(future) acts of terrorism;”43 does not alter the lawfulness of the mentioned resolutions 
under article 39. 
As discussed before, on the one hand article 103 of the Charter grants to SC 
decisions supreme priority over any other international obligation; on the other, SC 
actions appear broadly discretionary. This binding, completely discretionary power 
reminds the nightmare of the worse tyranny. Therefore some scholars have tried to find 
some limitations to the SC decision-making. They have examined the Charter and cited 
articles 24(2),44 1(3),45 2(2),46 55,47 and 5648 as significant limitations to SC action. If the 
SC violates any of these articles, according to the scholars, resolutions should be denied 
                                                 
41 Pierre d’Argent et al., Article 39, in JEAN-PIERRE COT, ALAIN PELLET (EDS.), 1 LA CHARTE DES NATIONS 
UNIES. COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE (3rd ed., 2005), p. 1163.  
42 Roberto Lavalle, A Novel, If Awkward, Exercise in International Law-Making: Security Council 
Resolution 1540 (2004), 51 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 411 (2004), at 416, discussing the second 
legislating episode after the resolution 1373 involving the Security Council, i.e. resolution 1540 of 2004. 
S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
43 ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2004), at p. 172. 
44 Article 24(2) states that all powers granted to the Security Council must be exercised “in accordance 
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. U.N. Charter article 24(2). 
45 Charter of the United Nations, article 1(3) (“The purposes of the United Nations are: […] to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all”). 
46 Charter of the United Nations, article 2(2) (“All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights 
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in 
accordance with the present Charter”). So must do the U.N. organs. See Robert Kolb, Article 2(2), in 
Bruno Simma, supra note 35, at 93. 
47 U.N. Charter article 55(c). 
48 U.N. Charter article 56 (“All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-
operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55”). 
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enforcement by domestic judges and declared void, by virtue of a kind of detournément 
de pouvoir.49  
We cannot agree with this view. First, it is apparent how vague and abstract the 
cited provisions are.50 How they could provide a guidance for the evaluation of 
resolutions’ lawfulness is still a mystery. Moreover, “suggestions that the courts of UN 
members could declare Chapter VII resolutions (partially) invalid [has] no legal basis”.51 
Indeed, were a domestic judge to use the weak tools contained in the Charter as a ground 
for judicial review, the system for maintaining international security would be at least 
partially struck down at domestic levels, and the international community’s efforts in 
fighting terrorism would be largely wasted. New safe harbors would be easily created 
for terrorist organizations. No one could sincerely believe that granting individual 
national judges the power to review SC decisions concerning terrorism would resolve 
the problem of limiting the SC’s powers. 
According to some scholars, one potential limitation of the SC action would lie in 
international human rights norms.52 However, most of these norms pertain to treaty or 
                                                 
49 See Erika De Wet, The Role of Human Rights in Limiting the Enforcement Power of the Security 
Council: A Principled View, in ERIKA DE WET, ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER (EDS.), REVIEW OF THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 7 (2003), pp. 24-28, who bases this conclusion on articles 25 and 2(5) of the 
U.N. Charter, both of which refer to measures adopted “in accordance with the present Charter”. U.N. 
Charter art. 25, and 2(5). According to this author, “the obligation to assist the organization in the first part 
of the sentence [of article 25] only concerns decisions by the Security Council under Chapter VII in as far 
as they were taken in accordance with the UN Charter. Thus, since article 2(5) obliges states to respect 
Chapter VII resolutions that were adopted in accordance with the UN Charter, the logical implication is 
that they are not bound to do so where this is not the case. It then becomes illogical to see how member 
states can be obliged in terms of article 25 to follow binding resolutions that are not in accordance with the 
UN Charter”. Id., p. 26 f. 
50 For instance, with regards to article 24 of the U.N. Charter, it has been pointed out that “this is a very 
broad and vague formula. One should read too much in it, or see it in isolation from more specific 
provisions in the rest of the UN Charter”. Anthony Aust, The Role of Human Rights in Limiting the 
Enforcement Powers of the Security Council: A Practitioner’s View, in ERIKA DE WET, ANDRÉ 
NOLLKAEMPER (EDS.), REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY MEMBER STATES 31 (2003), at p. 32.  
51 Anthony Aust, supra note 44, at p. 38. 
52 However, “most commentators, with very few exceptions, simply assume that the Security Council is 
obligated to respect human rights or humanitarian law rules when designing economic sanctions, and do 
Matteo M. Winkler 
 13
customary law, and would therefore be subject to article 103 prevalence rule.53 By 
article 103 “human rights would be officially downgraded to norms which are simply 
overridden by the need to respond to the security concerns expressed by the Security 
Council”.54 On the other hand, certain resolutions truly raise deep human rights 
concerns. The listing process under Resolution 1267,55 in particular, suggests “serious 
accountability issue[s]”56 with respect to individual freedoms. The SC, well aware of 
this problem, held, in its Resolution 1456 (2003), that 
“[…] states must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with 
all their obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in 
accordance with international law, in particular human rights, refugee, and 
humanitarian law.”57 
                                                                                                                                                
not analyze the origin, scope, and existence of the obligation in any detail”. August Reinisch, Developing 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accontability of the Security Council for the Imposition of 
Economic Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 851 (2001), at 853. 
53 Cf. the response of the U.K. Delegate under the scope of the resolution no. 1373 (2001) in the field of 
protection of human rights, according to which article 103 of the Charter would let the norms of the 
resolution to prevail on other international law norms concerning human rights. U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/SR.1963, § 25 (Oct. 23, 2001).  
54 Exactly, “[i]f all national counter-terrorism measures, challenged for non compliance with human rights 
treaties, could be justified and legitimated through a simple reference to article 103 of the UN Charter, 
human rights would be officially downgraded to norms which are simply overridden by the need to 
respond to the security concerns expressed by the Security Council.” Andrew Clapham, Terrorism, 
National Measures and International Supervision, in Andrea Bianchi (ed.), supra note 27, 283, at 295. See 
also Nicolas Angelet, International Law Limits to the Security Council, in VERA GOWLLAND-DEBBAS 
(ED.), UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW  71 (2001).   
55 S.C. Res. 1267, supra note 12. 
56 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A MORE SECURED WORLD: OUR 
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), § 152 (“the Security Council must proceed 
with caution. The way entities or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council and 
the absence of review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues and possibly violate 
fundamental human rights norms and conventions”). 
57 S.C. Res. 1456, § 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
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This norm apparently “demands compliance by states with human rights law thus 
removing any doubt as to the hierarchy of values to be protected”.58 Yet Resolution 1456 
does not have the same binding effect of Resolution 1267. In fact, while in the latter the 
SC “decides,” i.e. binds the states, in the former the SC simply “calls upon” states to 
take some steps. It is obvious, then, that Resolution 1456 embodies a recommendation 
addressed to states.59 Notoriously international recommendations have an “effect of 
legality” in the sense that to the extent to which states apply the recommended norms, 
they do not violate conflicting duties deriving from other international norms.60 This 
means that states which grant human rights could refuse to apply the SC resolutions. 
However, little is said about the domestic judge’s power to refuse to enforce the 
measures against listed individuals: could domestic courts simply disregard the 
applicant’s name on the blacklist and free his assets since Resolution 1269 breaches the 
applicant’s right to a judicial review? While the problem mostly hinges on this crucial 
point, no clear answer is actually provided by Resolution 1456. 
The views mentioned above also cite the jus cogens as representing the core of 
norms that SC cannot violate in its decision-making process. As a creature of the 
Charter, which is an international treaty, SC may not breach what the Charter itself 
could not breach, i.e., jus cogens. But what is jus cogens? And why should it bind the 
SC? We will address this question shortly. 
                                                 
58 Andrew Clapham, supra note 54, at 296. 
59 Notice that the in the resolution 1456, the Security Council “calls for the following steps to be taken”. 
S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 57, first sentence. This means that the norm of the resolution 1456 cited above 
should be considered as a recommendation, addressed by the Security Council to member states. 
60 As well known, U.N. organs recommendations produce the so-called “effect of legality”, that means that 
“a State does not commit a wrongful act when, in order to carry out a recommendation of a UN organ, it 
acts in a way that is contrary to commitments previously undertaken by agreement or by obligations 
deriving from customary international law”. BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW AD PRACTICE OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS (2nd ed., 2000), p. 279. As a result, it seems clear enough that states do not breach their 
obligations under the Security Council resolutions if they fulfil them in a way that is consistent with the 
human rights standards provided by international law. 
Matteo M. Winkler 
 15
 
III. The regional implementation of U.N. Resolutions 
A. The framework 
Article 48(2) of the U.N. Charter charges member states with executing the SC 
decisions through the mediation of international organizations of which they are 
members.61 Regarding the measures against the Taliban, the EC enacted the EC 
Regulation 337/2000,62 afterward abrogated by the Regulation 467/2001.63 Article 2 of 
the latter states that 
“[a]ll funds and other financial resources belonging to any natural or legal person, 
entity or body designated by the […] Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex I 
shall be frozen. 
No funds or other financial resources shall be made available, directly or 
indirectly, to or for the benefit of, persons, entities or bodies designated by the 
Taliban Sanctions Committee and listed in Annex I”.64 
Annex I contained the proscription list maintained by the TC, that the EC 
Commission, through appropriate regulations,65 provided from time to time to modify 
accordingly.66 Then, following the Security Council Resolution 1390,67 the EU enacted 
                                                 
61 U.N. Charter art. 48(2). 
62 EC Regulation 337/2000 of Feb. 14, 2000, concerning a flight ban and a freeze of funds and other 
financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, OJ L43 of Feb. 16, 2000, p. 1. 
63 EC Regulation 467/2001 of March 6, 2001, prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to 
Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources 
in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, and repealing Regulation no. 337/2000, OJ L67 of March 9, 
2001, p. 1. 
64 See EC Regulation 467/2001, art. 2, supra note 63. 
65 See EC Regulation 467/2001, art. 10(1), supra note 63. 
66 See for instance EC Regulation 2199/2001 of Nov. 12, 2001, amending, for the fourth time, regulation 
no. 467/2001, OJ 2001 L 295, p. 16. 
67 S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 17. 
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the Regulation 881/2002,68 which abrogated all of the previous regulations. Subsequent 
regulations made some exceptions for humanitarian considerations.69 European 
measures are thus identical, as to their subjective and objective scope, to the U.N. 
framework. As such, those Regulations are hierarchically subordinate to the European 
Community Treaty (ECT). 
Article 6 of the EU Treaty states that the EU and the EC respect human rights as 
protected under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).70 Formally, the 
EC71 is not a party to the ECHR; nevertheless, European institutions ensure this 
protection in the subject matter jurisdiction of European institutions.72  
In particular, article 6(1) of the ECHR states that:  
“[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.73 
With this in mind, we see that the regulations adopted by the EC in the fight 
against terrorist financing clearly clash with the fair trial guarantee provided by article 6 
of the ECHR. First, the freezing of assets involves the property rights of individuals and 
entities. Usually judicial review is ensured even when potential restrictions of property 
                                                 
68 EC regulation 881/2002, supra note 3. 
69 EC regulation 561/2003, amending, as regards exceptions to the freezing of funds and economic 
resources, regulation (EC) 881/2002, OJ 2003 L 82, p. 1. 
70 European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms [ECHR], signed in 
Rome on Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (into force since Sept. 3, 1953).  
71 The EU could not be a party to the ECHR because the EU, as commonly concluded by scholars, has no 
international legal personality for signing a treaty. 
72 See article 6(2) of the Treaty of the European Union. 
73 ECHR art. 6(1). The ECHR stated that “[t]he effect of Article 6(1) is, inter alia, to place the ‘tribunal’ 
under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the 
parties, without prejudice to its assessment of whether they are relevant to its decision”. Kraska v. 
Switzerland, (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 188 (decided on April 19, 1993), § 30. 
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rights are justifiable on the grounds of general interests or public security protection.74 
Indeed, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, concerned about an 
imbalanced application of the freezing measures, has submitted to the member states a 
body of recommendations, the Guidelines on human rights and the fight against 
terrorism.75 Article XIV of the Guidelines recognizes the right of public authorities to 
freeze the assets of alleged terrorists, but 
“the owners of the property have the possibility to challenge the lawfulness of 
such a decision before a court”.76 
It is thus uncontestable that freezing measures are subject to judicial review. 
A second problem arises with regard to the individuals’ ability to challenge the 
evidence presented by authorities.77 Even after recognition of the right to challenge the 
lawfulness of the freezing orders, information could be unavailable to petitioners. 
Consider, for instance, the listing mechanism: the information presented by states is 
gathered globally, often through secret agencies, then shared with other states in secret 
proceedings. “Since a freezing of assets will be brought about without any prior legal 
proceedings convicting persons of criminal offences, it is particularly important to 
                                                 
74 The ECHR clarified that the dispute can involve even a private party against a public authority. Namely, 
“[f]or Article 6, paragraph (1), to be applicable to a case (‘contestation’) it is not necessary that both 
parties to the proceedings should be private persons”. Ringeisen v. Austria, (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 455 
(July 16, 1971), § 94. 
75 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE GUIDELINES, 
Directorate General of Human Rights, Council of Europe (March 2005), available at 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/guidelines.asp. 
76 Human Rights and The Fight Against Terrorism, supra note 75, article XIV (“[t]he use of property of 
persons or organizations suspected of terrorist activities may be suspended or limited, notably by such 
measures as freezing orders or seizures, by the relevant authorities”). 
77 See Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain, (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 505 (June 23, 1993), § 63 (“[t]he right to have an 
adversarial trial means the opportunity for the parties to have knowledge of and comment on the 
observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party”). See also Rowe et Davis v. United Kingdom, 
(2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 1 (decided on February 16, 2000), § 60; JACOBS & WHITE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 156-158 (3rd ed., 2006). 
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ensure that freezing orders are imposed on the basis of sufficient evidence[, however] it 
is unclear how one is protected against being included in this list”.78 Now, the question 
is: who would check whether this basis actually exists? 
Moreover, “there is something distasteful about a process which begins by 
convicting someone and then proceeds to inquire whether there is a case against them”.79 
The presumption of innocence requires that individuals are entitled to protection from 
restraining measures unless prosecutors prove they are guilty. Here, the logic is 
completely inverted: one is suspected to be a terrorist, so his assets are frozen. The 
measure presupposes an allegation of commission or association with a crime:80 why 
would there be no judge available to evaluate the challenges of that allegation? 
 
B. Which judge for the review? 
The judge charged with the judicial review of the conformity of EC Regulations 
with respect to the EC Treaties is the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and, in first 
instance, the Court of First Instance (CFI).81 It is there that Yusuf, Al Barakaat and 
others tried to challenge the European Regulations under which their assets have been 
frozen since 2001. 
 
                                                 
78 August Reinisch, The Action of the European Union to Combat International Terrorism, in Andrea 
Bianchi (ed.), supra note 27, at 119, 131. 
79 Lord Archer of Sandwell, in UK TERRORISM ACT: 21 NEW PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS (abstract from 
the House of Lords debate on March 27, 2001), available at http://www.state 
watch.org/news/2001/oct/01proscribed.htm. 
80 See S. Peers, EU Responses to Terrorism, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 227 (2003), at 239 (“[w]hile the 
draconian measures of freezing assets and funding could arguably be justified in the case of a criminal 
conviction for financing terrorism or (provisionally) where relevant criminal charges have been laid or 
will be laid imminently, it is obviously a different question where the freezing takes place on the basis of 
‘soft’ intelligence information and there is no effective opportunity for a person to defend himself or 
herself against the allegation”).  
81 Treaty of the European Community, art. 230, supra note 5. 
Matteo M. Winkler 
 19
B.1. Yusuf’s complaints and defenses 
Petitioners in Yusuf sought the annulment of Regulation 881 before the CFI.82 
Their names had been inserted in the attached list, based on the TC’s decision. They 
claimed, among other things, that the Regulation in question violates article 6 of the 
ECHR. The violation would derive, in the petitioners’ view, from the fact that 
Regulation 881 “imposes on them heavy sanctions, both civil and criminal, although 
they had not first been heard or given the opportunity to defend themselves, nor had that 
act been subjected to any judicial review whatsoever”.83 In particular, “they were not 
told why the sanctions were imposed on them, [and] the evidence and facts relied on 
against them were not communicated to them and […] they had no opportunity to 
explain themselves”.84 Moreover, none of the European institutions involved in the 
enactment process satisfactorily ascertained the reasons why the applicants were inserted 
in the blacklist. The listing proceeding was, in other words, “stamped with the seal of 
secrecy”.85 Finally, they argue that the remedy of annulment, as provided by the ECT, is 
useless, given that the Court cannot examine the merits of the adopted measures in 
depth.86 
The EC Council and Commission argued, to the contrary, that the EC had no 
choice but to enforce the SC decisions. By this rationale, although the EC is not a party 
                                                 
82 Case T-306/01, supra note 2, § 42. The petition was filed in 2001 under the Regulation 467/2001, that 
has been abrogated by the Regulation 881/2002. Since the latter has substituted the former in the same 
object, the Court consented the parties to move their claims against the new Regulation. See id., §§ 50-55.  
83 Id., § 190. 
84 Id., § 191. 
85 Id. 
86 Id., § 195 (“an action for annulment, which concerns only the lawfulness of the contested regulation as 
such, does not allow of an in-depth examination of the lawfulness of the sanctions in the light of the 
fundamental rights allegedly infringed. In addition, having regard to the legislative technique used, which 
consisted of drawing up lists of persons and entities covered by those sanctions, such an in-depth 
examination would be pointless, since it would be limited to ascertaining whether the names in those lists 
corresponded to those in the Sanctions Committee’s lists”). 
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to the U.N. Charter, it is obliged to act in a way that enables member states to fulfill their 
obligations under the same Charter.87 Moreover, the SC had already taken into 
consideration, during the decision-making process, the tension between the rights of the 
victims of terrorism and the general individual rights, giving the first precedence.88 
Accordingly, the EC had no authority to evaluate the content of the lists transmitted by 
the TC: had it questioned the merits of those lists, it would have undermined the entire 
international security system, as well as the good relations between the states involved. 
The European Courts should therefore play a role in the review of the EC measures, 
since “full judicial review would risk undermining the system of the United Nations as 
established in 1945, might seriously damage the international relations of the 
Community and its Member States and would conflict with the obligation on the 
Community to comply with international law”.89 
As stated above, the CFI rejected the petitions in their entirety. 
 
B.2. The judgment 
In its judgment, the CFI preliminarily observes that SC Resolutions prevail over 
all other international law norms, including the provisions concerning human rights. Of 
                                                 
87 Id., § 210 (“[a]lthough the Community itself is not a member of the United Nations, it is required to act, 
in its spheres of competence, in such a way as to fulfil the obligations imposed on its Member States as a 
result of their belonging to the United Nations”). 
88 Id., § 217 (“the Council responds that there are grounds for supposing that, under the special powers 
conferred on it by Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council weighed up the fundamental rights of 
the victims of the sanctions against those of the victims of terrorism, in particular the right of the latter to 
life”). 
89 Id., § 225 (“according to the Council […] where the Community acts without exercising any 
discretionary power, on the basis of a decision taken by the body on which the international community 
has conferred considerable powers with a view to preserving international peace and security, full judicial 
review would risk undermining the system of the United Nations as established in 1945, might seriously 
damage the international relations of the Community and its Member States and would conflict with the 
obligation on the Community to comply with international law”). 
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course, the Court’s reference is article 103 of the U.N. Charter.90 Clearly, EC “Member 
States may, and indeed must, leave unapplied any provision of Community law, whether 
a provision of primary law or a general principle of that law, that raises any impediment 
to the proper performance of their obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations”.91 In enacting the SC resolutions, the EC institutions have no discretion; as 
such, they cannot alter the content of the lists and must respect the SC’s statements.92 
In other words, EC has no competence to review the Security Council decisions.93 
Such a review would indeed violate international law, EC law, and EU law, because 
                                                 
90 Id., § 231 (“[a]ccording to this norm, “[f]rom the standpoint of international law, the obligations of the 
Member States of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations clearly prevail over every 
other obligation of domestic law or of international treaty law including, for those of them that are 
members of the Council of Europe, their obligations under the ECHR and, for those that are also members 
of the Community, their obligations under the EC Treaty”). 
91 Id., § 240. 
92 Id., §§ 265-267 (“acted under circumscribed powers, with the result that they had no autonomous 
discretion. In particular, they could neither directly alter the content of the resolutions at issue nor set up 
any mechanism capable of giving rise to such alteration. […] Any review of the internal lawfulness of the 
contested regulation, especially having regard to the provisions or general principles of Community law 
relating to the protection of fundamental rights, would therefore imply that the Court is to consider, 
indirectly, the lawfulness of those resolutions. In that hypothetical situation, in fact, the origin of the 
illegality alleged by the applicant would have to be sought, not in the adoption of the contested regulation 
but in the resolutions of the Security Council which imposed the sanctions. […] In particular, if the Court 
were to annul the contested regulation, as the applicants claim it should, although that regulation seems to 
be imposed by international law, on the ground that that act infringes their fundamental rights which are 
protected by the Community legal order, such annulment would indirectly mean that the resolutions of the 
Security Council concerned themselves infringe those fundamental rights. In other words, the applicants 
ask the Court to declare by implication that the provision of international law at issue infringes the 
fundamental rights of individuals, as protected by the Community legal order”). 
93 Id., §§ 269-270 (“[i]t must be recognised that such a limitation of jurisdiction is necessary as a corollary 
to the principles identified above, in the Court’s examination of the relationship between the international 
legal order under the United Nations and the Community legal order. […] As has already been explained, 
the resolutions of the Security Council at issue were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations. In these circumstances, determining what constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security and the measures required to maintain or re-establish them is the responsibility of the Security 
Council alone and, as such, escapes the jurisdiction of national or Community authorities and courts”). See 
also Maria Eugenia Bartoloni, L’ambito di applicazione ratione personae degli articoli 301 e 60 TCE 
nelle recenti sentenze Yusuf e Kadi [The scope ratione personae of Articles 301 and 60 of the ECT in the 
recent judgments concerning Yusuf and Kadi], 11 DIR. UN. EUR. 316 (2006), at p. 329. 
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“reference to infringements either of fundamental rights as protected by the 
Community legal order or of the principles of that legal order cannot affect the 
validity of a Security Council measure or its effect in the territory of the 
Community.”94 
In the Court’s view, however, the decision reached here does not imply that the EC 
Courts could not exercise any judicial review of SC resolutions. In particular, as a first 
step the court considers that it can adjudicate accidentally the issue of whether the SC 
Resolutions are consistent with the international law norms called of jus cogens.95 
United Nations organs, in fact, cannot violate the jus cogens.96 In the Court’s view, 
fundamental human rights are part of the jus cogens. As a second step, the court inquires 
whether the rights allegedly violated in the applicants’ complaints are part of the jus 
cogens and, further, whether those rights apply in this case. 
The Court addresses three different points. First, it deals with the right of not being 
deprived of property.97 Under international law, property rights may be disregarded by 
virtue of considerations related to the fight against terrorism. Here, restrictions are 
justified by the general interest of the global community in protecting its population 
                                                 
94 Id., § 275.  
95 Id., § 277 (“the Court is empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the resolutions of the 
Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens”). 
96 Id., § 277 (“[jus cogens can be] understood as a body of higher rules of public international law binding 
on all subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and from which no 
derogation is possible”), and 281 (“[i]nternational law thus permits the inference that there exists one limit 
to the principle that resolutions of the Security Council have binding effect: namely, that they must 
observe the fundamental peremptory provisions of jus cogens. If they fail to do so, however improbable 
that may be, they would bind neither the Member States of the United Nations nor, in consequence, the 
Community”). 
97 Under the ECHR, article 1 of the Protocol no. 1 states that “Every natural or legal person is entitled to 
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international 
law”. CAMILO B. SCHUTTE, THE EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PROPERTY. ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL 
NO. 1 TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS ORIGINS, ITS WORKING AND ITS IMPACT ON 
NATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 20 (2004).  
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from terrorism.98 In any case, the right does not appear to be violated by Regulation 881, 
since the TC Guidelines provide for a mechanism of review on the part of the listed 
people through the mediation of their resident state.99 
Second, the Court examines the alleged violation of the right to a fair hearing. The 
CFI notes, in this regard, that the contested resolutions fail to provide for a right to be 
heard during the listing proceedings. However, that right’s denial can be grounded in 
both practical and political considerations. From a practical standpoint, a cogent norm 
imposing the right to a previous hearing does not exist,100 while politically speaking 
requiring an advance notification would deprive the measures of their very preventive 
effects.101 Moreover, the Court focuses on the TC Guidelines,102 whose article 7 
describes the procedure for reviewing the proscription lists. The Court sees embedded in 
article 7 the expression of the SC’s concerns about the protection of human rights.103 
The procedure outlined there is structured in three phases. First, the listed person files a 
complaint to his residence or national government; in the petition, she “should provide 
justification for the de-listing request, offer relevant information and request support for 
de-listing”.104 Then, the government examines the complaint, contacts the states that 
                                                 
98 Case T-306/01, supra note 2, § 296 (“[i]n that regard, it is appropriate to stress the importance of the 
fight against international terrorism and the legitimacy of the protection of the United Nations against the 
actions of terrorist organisations”), and 298 (“[t]he measures in question pursue therefore an objective of 
fundamental public interest for the international community”). 
99 See infra notes 104 ff. 
100 Id., § 307. 
101 Id., § 308. Immediate enforcement of these measures is required as a matter of prevention. For 
instance, in the United States “[e]ach time a new set of sanctions is ordered an entirely new set of 
regulatory control is created”. Peter L. Fitzgerald, supra note 8, p. 966. This delays greatly the preventive 
effects of the measures themselves and increases the risk of further terrorist attacks in the future. 
102 See TC Guidelines, supra note 21. 
103 See Case T-306/01, supra note 2, § 312. At § 313, the CFI recalls the Resolution 1526 (2004). S.C. 
Res. 1526, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1526 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
104 See TC Guidelines, supra note 21, par. 7(a). 
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proposed the inclusion of that person, and consults with them.105 Third, the Committee 
deliberates on the request of the petitioned government, with or without support of the 
designating government(s), “by consensus of its members.”106 It is true, according to the 
Court, that “the procedure described above confers no right directly on the persons 
concerned themselves to be heard by the Sanctions Committee.”107 However, the Court 
continues, in the case of dismissal the petitioner could challenge the result before the 
domestic courts.108 Even with this option available, the petitioner is not privy to the 
reasons for being listed. In fact, the related information are secured by diplomatic 
secrecy, protected also in the Committee deliberation proceedings. In the Court’s view, 
however, this is not sufficient to prove that the right to a fair hearing has been violated; 
international security requires this information to stay secret.109 
Lastly, the Court considers the right to an effective judicial remedy. Here, it 
notices that, in practice, this right is denied by the SC.110 However, in the Court’s view 
this right is not absolute, and includes some exceptions. In brief, this right can be 
suppressed to protect the general interest of the global community, involving peace and 
international security. The review procedure depicted in paragraph 7 of the TC 
                                                 
105 Id., § 7(b). 
106 Id., § 7(e). 
107 Case T-306/01, supra note 2, § 314. 
108 Id., § 317 (“it is open to the persons involved to bring an action for judicial review based on domestic 
law, indeed even directly on the contested regulation and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council 
which it puts into effect, against any wrongful refusal by the competent national authority to submit their 
cases to the Sanctions Committee for re-examination”). 
109 Id., § 319 f. (“observance of the fundamental rights of the persons concerned does not require the facts 
and evidence adduced against them to be communicated to them, once the Security Council or its 
Sanctions Committee is of the view that there are grounds concerning the international community’s 
security that militate against it”). 
110 Id., § 340 (“[i]t must thus be concluded […] that there is no judicial remedy available to the applicant, 
the Security Council not having thought it advisable to establish an independent international court 
responsible for ruling, in law and on the facts, in actions brought against individual decisions taken by the 
Sanctions Committee”). 
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Guidelines is all that can be reasonably expected, in such a system, to ensure an 
adequate balance between the right to a judicial remedy and the exigencies inherent in 
the fight against terrorism.111 
 
IV. Critics 
In formulating or assessing criticisms to the Yusuf decision, one should keep in 
mind that, as stated above, the SC enjoys full discretion in initiating an action under 
Chapter VII, with the exception of the jus cogens. This point has been expressly 
recognized by the Yusuf Court.112 Obviously, this conclusion was not sufficient to rule 
that the SC violated the petitioners’ right, since the Court still had to prove, as an initial 
premise, that the judicial review of measures affecting property rights was part of the jus 
cogens. Surprisingly, the Court made no such argument. It never ascertained the 
peremptory character of the right to a judicial review, but only affirmed that some 
“mandatory provisions concerning the universal protection of human rights”113 exist, 
without specifying whether the right to judicial review is among these provisions. Of 
                                                 
111 Id., § 345 (“in the absence of an international court having jurisdiction to ascertain whether acts of the 
Security Council are lawful, the setting-up of a body such as the Sanctions Committee and the 
opportunity, provided for by the legislation, of applying at any time to that committee in order to have any 
individual case re-examined, by means of a procedure involving both the ‘petitioned government’ and the 
‘designating government’ (see §§ 310 and 311 above), constitute another reasonable method of affording 
adequate protection of the applicants’ fundamental rights as recognised by jus cogens”). 
112 According to the jus cogens doctrine, codified in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of 
treaties, all treaties contrary to jus cogens norms are null and void. Accordingly, states cannot transfer to 
an international organization powers that they cannot use in a treaty as a consequence of article 53 above. 
However, the jus cogens doctrine has been significantly criticized, as it is based on a controvertial and 
problematic practice. See Michael J. Glennon, De l’absurdité du droit imperatif (jus cogens), 90 REV. 
GÉN. DR. INT. PUBLIC 529 (2006), at 530. 
113 Case T-306/01, supra note 2, at § 282. Precisely, the Court stated that: 
“the mandatory provisions concerning the universal protection of human rights, from which 
neither the Member States nor the bodies of the United Nations may derogate because they 
constitute ‘intransgressible principles of international customary law’”  
(quoting The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. 226 [July 
8, 1996], § 79). 
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course, the answer could be nothing but affirmative; otherwise the entirety of the Court’s 
analysis would be contradictory. However, the rationale behind its conclusion remain 
unknown.114 The lack of argument on this point is motivated, in our view, by the fact 
that in actuality, judicial review cannot be asserted to be currently a part of the jus 
cogens. 
Why did the Court insist on its power to ascertain whether a violation of jus 
cogens had really occurred, even when it had no basis for affirming that? The answer 
lies in the section of Yusuf in which the Court states that it has no jurisdiction over the 
Regulations that the EC is obliged to adopt, because of the supremacy of U.N. norms.115 
Despite the lack of jurisdiction, the Court still maintains that it has residual jurisdiction 
for determining whether the SC violated jus cogens.116 Nevertheless, this power would 
never go beyond an “indirect check”.117 Thus, the Court refuses to afford a judicial 
review of EC Regulations, but reserves for itself the judicial review of the SC 
Resolutions. In our view, this reasoning is not at all persuasive. Article 230 of the ECT 
vests European Courts with the power of judicial review regarding the actions of 
European institutions: when the review of European Regulations becomes impossible 
because the Courts lack jurisdiction, there is no other means to decide upon the SC 
Resolutions that are the legal basis of those Regulations. 
                                                 
114 See Benedetto Conforti, Decisioni del Consiglio di sicurezza e diritti fondamentali in una bizzarra 
sentenza del Tribunale comunitario di primo grado [UN Security Council Decisions and fundamental 
rights according to a “bizarre” judgment of the EC Court of first instance], 11 DIR. UN. EUR. 333 (2006), 
pp. 339-341. 
115 Id., § 254 (“it must be held, first, that the Community may not infringe the obligations imposed on its 
Member States by the Charter of the United Nations or impede their performance and, second, that in the 
exercise of its powers it is bound, by the very Treaty by which it was established, to adopt all the measures 
necessary to enable its Member States to fulfil those obligations”). On the correctness of this solution, see 
Benedetto Conforti, supra note 114, at p. 336. 
116 See supra note 95, where the CFI affirms that it “is empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of 
the resolutions of the Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens”. Case T-306/01, supra note 
2, § 277, emphasis added. 
117 Id. (“the Court is empowered to check, indirectly …”). 
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Furthermore, one might wonder whether the right to a judicial review had actually 
been violated by the SC. Here, the Court seems to admit as much, but then replies in the 
negative because that right, by itself, can be derogated … due to the resolutions of the 
Security Council itself (sic)!118 Limitations of the right to a judicial review could be 
justified by an immunity of the SC resolutions: therefore, the Court says, SC must 
respect jus cogens, but jus cogens can be derogated for reasons of international security 
… that are in the powers of the Security Council to determine!119 This reasoning is 
purely tautological.  If the power to derogate ordinary rights is based upon the SC itself, 
one should ask whether it makes sense to recall the jus cogens or whether it would be 
more correct to assume that SC is free from any constraints. 
On this point the Court, in order to confirm the relative nature of the right to an 
effective judicial remedy, recalls state immunity from jurisdiction. It points out, in 
particular, that “certain restrictions must be held to be inherent in that right, such as the 
limitations generally recognised by the community of nations to fall within the doctrine 
                                                 
118 See Alessandra Gianelli, Il rapporto tra diritto internazionale e diritto comunitario secondo il 
tribunale di primo grado delle Comunità europee [The relationship between international law and 
communitarian law according to the Court of First Instance of the European Communities], 89 RIVISTA DI 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 131 (2006), at 138 (“[n]on si comprende qui come un diritto riconosciuto da 
norme imperative possa contenere in sé il limite delle risoluzioni vincolanti del Consiglio di sicurezza: a 
meno che ciò non significhi che il Consiglio non è vincolato dalle norme cogenti, così ribaltando il 
presupposto stesso dell’analisi del Tribunale” [“[i]t is not understandable here how a right that is 
recognized by cogent norms could be limited by itself by binding resolutions of the Security Council: 
unless this meant that the Council is not bound by jus cogens, thus reversing the Court’s assumption”]). 
119 See case T-306/01, supra note 2, § 343 f.: 
“[i]n this instance, the Court considers that the limitation of the applicants’ right of access 
to a court, as a result of the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed as a rule, in the domestic 
legal order of the Member States of the United Nations, by resolutions of the Security 
Council adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in accordance 
with the relevant principles of international law (in particular Articles 25 and 103 of the 
Charter), is inherent in that right as it is guaranteed by jus cogens. 
[…] Such a limitation is justified both by the nature of the decisions that the Security 
Council is led to take under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and by the 
legitimate objective pursued. In the circumstances of this case, the applicants’ interest in 
having a court hear their case on its merits is not enough to outweigh the essential public 
interest in the maintenance of international peace and security in the face of a threat clearly 
identified by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. 
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of State immunity”.120 This is an evident oversight.121 First, practice shows that state 
immunity has relevant exceptions in the case of a gross violation of human rights. 
Second, once it is affirmed that fundamental human rights are part of jus cogens –– and 
therefore that the corresponding obligations are not negotiable, nor waivable by states –– 
it would logically follow that states cannot use immunity as a defense for justifying 
human rights violations. Finally, it is difficult to understand why the court is giving 
deference to the immunity principle, which even under a strict normative hierarchy 
theory could not prevail over jus cogens.122 
The Court, then, seems to be deeply concerned about the fact that the TC provides 
for a mechanism of judicial review.123 It confirms that this mechanism, although partial, 
is sufficient. Assuring that the right to a judicial review is established by jus cogens 
norms, the real question is not whether a true remedy is available, but whether the 
remedy provided by the SC or the TC corresponds to the standard established under jus 





                                                 
120 Case T-306/01, supra note 2, § 342, emphasis added. 
121 Benedetto Conforti, supra note 114, at p. 343. 
122 On the point, see the interesting analysis of Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus 
Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741 (2003), at 744, discussing 
the inadequacy of the normative hierarchy approach to explain why immunity should be disregarded when 
fundamental human rights violations are concerned. From the standpoint of the normative hierarchy 
theory, human rights – in the case, the ban of torture – would prevail, as norms of jus cogens, on the 
norms concerning the immunity of states. So states sued before domestic courts for human rights 
violations cannot use the immunity defense. According to Chaplan, the limitation of human rights 
violation lies in the immunity itself – because of its aims to benefit the community of nations – without 
any need of calling jus cogens or hierarchy conflicts. 
123 Id., § 345. 




“Sometimes a court does not work as it should.”124 This is the case in the decision 
of the Yusuf court. The ruling is so contradictory that, should the ECJ uphold the CFI’s 
rulings in the appeals proceeding without further clarifications, a dangerous precedent 
would be set in European law. The ECJ will hopefully need to ascertain whether the 
right to judicial review is actually a part of the jus cogens. At any rate, we believe it is 
not. However, regardless of this issue, a mechanism of review should be provided, at the 
very least, for corrections of errors in the lists. But this remedy certainly could not be 
assessed at the regional level: the SC itself should provide a mechanism for the list’s 
review.  
Here is what we propose: a judicial panel, composed of a certain number of 
impartial and independent individuals,125 whose names have been proposed by the 
Secretary General and elected by the General Assembly. The panel would deal with the 
review of the TC list. Such an organ would present several advantages. First, it would 
avoid multistate litigation, which might potentially fuel conflicts between domestic and 
                                                 
124 Owen Fiss, Between Supremacy and Exclusivity, in RICHARD W. BAUMAN & TSVI KAHANA (EDS.), THE 
LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH. THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 452 (2006), at p. 463. 
125 The special prominency of these people has a particular significance from the standpoint of the 
accuracy of international law’s ascertainment by judges. As in Yusuf, the CFI erred in interpreting the jus 
cogens without saying whether the right to a judicial remedy is part of that body of norms. As we noticed 
in the text, this was a very important point, that deserved attention by the Court. This analysis requires 
time, resources, strong undertaking and, maybe, particular skills. Often judges prefer to cut the problem 
and solve the dispute using pure prevailing principles, such as article 103 of the U.N. Charter, because a 
different solution would otherwise require them to explore unknown fields. This situation is absolutely 
unfair from the standpoint of the need of justice and, at least, contrary to the prohibition of non liquet, that 
keeps the situation as it is, unchanged forever, and, of course, gives courts a way for escaping their 
responsibility. See for instance Hersch Lauterpacht, Some Observations on the Prohibition of ‘Non Liquet’ 
and the Completeness of the Law, in MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI (ED.), SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 433 
(2000), at 444 (non liquet was used “whenever the necessity of reaching a decision was politically 
embarassing and inconvenient”). 
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supranational courts, or between various supranational courts.126 Second, the proposed 
solution would ensure a uniform interpretation of SC resolutions, regardless of the 
venue. Results that differ from nation to nation could undermine the stability of the 
prevention regime and frustrate effective action by the SC. Third, the proposed organ 
would ensure states’ good faith by increasing the standard of reliability for the lists 
presented to the Committees: by consolidating rulings into a single settlement, and 
creating a range of precedents governing the level of due diligence in the listing 
proceedings would make efforts to stem terrorism financing more credible and efficient. 
Finally, the proposal would prevent domestic courts from interfering inappropriately in 
delicate matters, such as international relations, political or diplomatic issues, foreign 




                                                 
126 For instance, should the problem of granting an actual judicial review of EC and EU laws remain 
unsettled, a conflict between the ECJ and the ECtHR could arise many coordination problems, that 
become heavier depending on the risk of unadmissible violations of fundamental human rights in the 
European concern. 
